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Before her eyes was the violent blue sky- nothing else. For an endless 
moment she looked into it. Like a great overpowering sound it destroyed 
everything in her mind, paralyzed her. Someone had once said to her that 
the sky hides the night behind it, shelters the person beneath from the 
horror that lies above. Unblinking, she fixed the solid emptiness, and the 
anguish began to move in her. At any moment, the rip can occur, the 
edges fly back, and the giant maw will be revealed. 
-Paul Bowles, The Sheltering Sky 
No definition of science is complete without a reference to terror. 
- Don DeLillo, Ratner's Star 
In the margin of a copy of Diophantus' Arithmetica is scribbled Fermat's last 
theorem. This bit of marginalia, which asserts that a specific mathematical equation 
can never really be satisfied, has haunted mathematicians for three centuries. No one 
has been able to reconstruct Fermat 's proof for this assertion; but no one has been able 
to counter the assertion either.1 It is a precursor of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principie 
and Godel 's Theorum formulated even as Newton was theorizing his dynamic theories 
l. JF n>2. then there is no solution to xn + yn = zn. Severa! mathemacícians have claimed 
to ha ve the proof for Fermat 's theorem (including Fermat himself, who claimed to have found the 
proof, but teasingly remarked that the margin of Arithmetica was too small to hold it), most 
recently Andrew Wiles of Princeton University. Fermat's equation is a single line; Wiles's «proof» 
is 200 pages long and remains to be verified. 
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of a clockwork universe; «laws» premised upon the constants of position, velocity and 
mass and verified through clock-time. 
E ven systems as logical and constant as mathematics tremble upon the void. For 
the system of real numbers, the symbols that constitute the language of mathematics, 
were chosen for their utility and not for their correspondence with reality. Mathematics 
is pure language, pure pattem, pure abstraction, pure routine- a collection of symbols 
that refer only to themselves. According to Roger Penrose in The Emperor's New Mind, 
real numbers refer to a mathematical idealization rather than to any actual physically 
objective quantity. The system of real numbers has the property, for example, that 
between any two of them, no matter how close, there lies a third. It is not at all clear 
that physical distances or times can realistically be said to have this property. (86) 
Don DeLillo, in Ratner's Star, defines mathematics as «what the world is when we 
subtract our own perceptions ... the press to measure and del ve ... in annotated ivory tools, 
Jengths of notched wood, in the waveguide manipulation of light and our nosings into the 
choreography of protons» ( 432). Through malhematics «we implicate ourselves in endless 
uncertainty» (432). References to mathematics occur in most ofDeLillo's novels, but his 
most cutting criticism of this scientific impulse to codify and control occurs in Ratner's 
Star, a novel whose very structure, as Tom LeClair has shown, is «the history of 
mathematics ... moving in its 2,500 years away from it~ foundations in concrete experience 
toward increasing abstraction, and then, in the twentieth century, moving backward through 
its achievements toinvestigatethosefoundations»2 (ll6).Ratner's Startraces BillyTwillig's 
(and other) attempts to decode a mysterious message supposedly sent by an intelligent 
race («Ratnerians») living in the vicinity ofRatner 's Star. Billy, who believes that there is 
nothing scary about mathematics, eventually decodes the message, proving that it originated 
from Earth rather than Ratner's Star (which turns out lo be a black hole-the ultimate 
nonrepresentable terror of Lhe universe) At the same time, he learns about the true terror at 
the heart of mathematics, a terror unleashed by mathematicians' attempts to investigate ( or 
deconstruct) the very foundations of mathematics itself. The inhabitants ofField Experiment 
Number One attempt to creare a metamathematics, «Logicon,» which, according to Char-
les Molesworth, «is needed in order to insure the coherence ofthe mathematical solutions 
that will be developed and to control ali possible communication with extraterrestrials» 
(147). Of course, any attempt to create a complete system only proves the incompleteness 
of any one system (Géidel's Theorum once again), revealing the uncertainty and terror that 
underlies systematizing attempts to repress and control. Even Billy eventually succumbs 
to the terror at the heart of mathematical abstraction, following his mentor, Rob Softly, 
into a (symbolically black) hole at the end of the novel. 
2 . (n an interview with LeClair (one of only twomajor interviews he's given) DeLillo says 
of Ratner's Star: «I wanted the book to become what it was about. Abstrae! structures and 
connective patterns. A piece of mathematics in short» ( «An Interview With Don DeLillo», 
Contemporary Lilerature 23 [1982] , p. 27). 
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DeLillo 's metaphor for this fundamental uncertainty at the heart of all systems is 
a mathematical equivalent and fictionalization of the concept of black holes, the 
«mohole», named after Orang Mohole, one ofthe eccentric mathematicians in Ratner's 
Star. Mohole has come up with «a unique system of relativity,» at whose core is the 
«mohole totality» or «value-dark dimension» (80). The essence ofMoholean relativity, 
«that in a moho le the laws of physics vary from one observer to another» ( 185), is 
complete uncertainty and, consequently, terror. A mohole is like a mirror that reflects 
light and sound to other parts of the universe, except that it is not a mirror.3 «lt's 
part of a theoretical dimension lacking spatial extent and devoid of time value. 
Value-dark in other words» (181). Moho les can 't exist in Einstein 's space-time 
continuum: «' wherever there are moholes' implies that a moho le occupies space, 
which it doesn't. 1 suppose it could be said that a mohole is space-time raised to a 
higher electrovalent power, or sylphed» (181). What is certain about moholes is 
that they revea! «the inadequacies of human Ianguage in the face of the mohole 
phenomenon» ( 181 ), the inadequacy of language to adequately represent and defi-
ne exactly what a mohole is. The mere mention of moholes is enough to unleash fear 
and terror in Mohole's fellow scientists: 
Just mention the value-dark dimension and people go glassy-eyed. Ali 
these fears about invisible mass. These morbid parties fu]) of whimpering people. 
Missing matter is explained by Moholean relativity. The mass holding the galaxies 
together is trapped in moholes. This is why we can 't find it. .. Oddly the people 
showing the greatest fear are often the same ones who support every step in my 
formulation, from the big bang to the n-bottomed hole. The explanation for the 
missing mass frightens them more than the fact that so much mass is missing 
(183). 
So does the fact that Earth itself tums out to be in a mohole. As Tom LeClair 
comments, «the utterly abstract Mohole theory is transformed into a concrete truth that 
causes an almost religious terror in Billy and the other scientists» (130). Ironically, as 
the efforts of the scientists and mathematicians in Ratner's Star show, it is the very 
attempt to systematize, to explain, that reveals the fundamental uncertainty and terror 
of the unknowable and nonsystematizable. 
DeLillo's interest in mathematics is directly related to his interest in how «the 
3. A mohole, like a black hole, is nonrepresentational. Mohole tells Billy: «lncidentally, 
its no good trying to visualize a mohole. I've airead y tried and it can 't be done. Nobody knows 
what it looks like because it doesn't look like anything» (p. 181). Of course, Billy would have no 
problem visualizing what Mohole looks like-but this confusion of names (and names that represent 
nonrepresentational concepts) and the objects they signify points to the poststructuralist concept 
of language as a set of arbitrary signi fiers. 
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inadequacy» of language represses its own incompJeteness through the logocentric 
operation of such constants as transcendental truth-and how this incompleteness is 
linked to the concept of terror discussed above. Although DeLillo has denied any interest 
in contemporary language theory,4 he is in close agreement with Derrida in his belief 
that it is language itself that orders reality by creating systems of safety that paradoxically 
seek to conceal the fact that reality (world) has no real connection with the symbols 
(word) that represent it. Like many postmodem linguistic philosophers, DeLillo feels 
we seek to create our sense of unity by locating a point (or constan!) from which a 
routine, or system of safety, can be constructed. Yet, for Delillo, it is not only the 
representational failure of mathematics, but of language itself, that is the undoing of ali 
systems based upon centralized, transcendental truths. 
It is in The Names that Delillo most directly investigates the need to «subdue and 
codify» (80), to order the random, chaotic void of the universe in to a meaningful"pattern 
of repetition and reinforcement. Here James Ax ton, an American expatriate risk analyst 
living in Athens, attempts to find out «how far men will go to satisfy a pattern, or find 
a pattem, or fit together the elements of a pattem» (80) by himsel f trying to find meaning 
in the apparently random murders of a possible terrorist group. Terrorism becomes the 
hinge that breaks apart the system of safety called «routine» in the novel, revealing the 
chaos, the disorder, inherent in the system, the element that cannot be signified or codified 
into order, but only suppressed. This is the «surprise» of routine. As we continue to 
construct more elaborate systems of mechanized routine in order to subdue and codify 
the void, to satisfy the pattem, to find a unifying light that is only (in twentieth century 
terrns) a cinematic iliusion, we only increase the ability for terror to influence and 
overwhelm us. 
Delillo 's central example of this process is the filmmaker Frank Volterra, who, 
defeated in his attempt to understand terrorism by trying to film one ofthe cult's murders 
(and thus represent terror on film) , contemplates the solace offered by the mechanical 
routine of opening and operating Frank's Sarne Day Dry Cleaning. Volterra himselfhas 
been subdued and codified by his contact with chaos and seeks refuge in the ordinary, 
the repetitious, the predictable. Plots, whether as simple as Volterra 's scheme, oras 
complex as the marginalized CIA agents' assassination of President Kennedy in Libra, 
are attempts to order or control chaos. For DeLillo it is such attempts at systematization 
itsel f that empower terror and death in the first place. In attempting to suppress terror, 
to master it, Delillo's characters only succeed in unleashing it and in tum destroying 
4. In a recent interview, Anthony DeCunis asked DeLillo, «In The Names and some of 
your other books, language itself seems to be one of your subjects. That self-referential quality 
parallels a lot of theoretical work being done in philosophy and literary criticism these days. Do 
you read much writing of that kind?» DeLillo replied, «No, I don ' t» (fntroducing Doi1 DeLillo, p. 
61). 
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their carefully plotted systems of safety. For Delillo, ali plots, whether terrorist plots or 
fictional plots, end up promoting death.5 
If DeLillo seems obsessed with tbe nature of language and its relation to tbe 
world, DeLillo's relatively few interpreters are absolutely obsessed with tbe nature of 
language in bis novels. The Names, in which language seems to be the central concem, 
has elicited particular attention to DeLillo 's attitudes and uses of language. For example, 
Tom LeClair reduces DeLillo 's penchant for «composing textual pattems» in The Na mes 
to «Spatial fonn, a structure of correspondences, multiple subtexts, and narrative 
perspectivism» ( 178). And David Bosworth writes: 
The Names is about «naming,» about language, about its irrational, emotive, 
almost mystical power; about how, beneath the pale skin of their meaning, words 
link up in a kind of geometric abstract art that soothes our deepest fears and 
satisfies our most urgent need to rescue order from the chaos of our lives ... 
DeLillo irnpresses on us bis view that whatmatters about language is its «paltem,» 
its deeper rhythms and syntax, the design behind tbe signs rather tban wbat they 
signify. (29-30) 
Tbis recalls Deleuze and Guattari 's notion in A Thousand Plateaus of a sign as 
referring only to other signs, which add up to a temporary, amorphous continuum, a 
postsignifying regime of signs, rather tban a supposedly stable, «paranoid-interpretive 
ideal» system of signification. It is the pattem that is important, not what tbe pattem 
signifies, since signs refer only to otber signs. Tbis revolutionary, countersignifying 
regime «marks a mobile and plural distribution, wbich itself determines functions and 
relations, wbicb arrives at arrangements rather than totals, distributions ratber tban 
collections, whicb operates more by breaks, transitions, migrations, and accumulation 
tban by combining units» ( 118). An «accurate» interpretation of exactly wbat a pattem 
signifies is impossible. Significance is not represented from, but projected upon, the 
world, wbich becomes a white wall or blank screen upon wbich meaning is produced. 
Contrary to DeLillo's public statements about a lack of interest in contemporary 
theory, bis ideas on language often mirror those of poststructuralist theorists like Deleuze 
and Guattari. DeLillo, however, is also a novelist, and most of bis critics, in their 
5. DeLillo 's Libra both supports and undercuts the paranoid notion that ali plots are seamless 
structures, logical connections that add up to a central interpretive truth. For DeLillo, the paranoid 
necessity to plot, to control the diverse multiplicity of the world through a carefully constructed 
system of safety, is a death-promoting activity. Nicholas Branch, the CIA employee in Libra 
charged with writing an official «history» of the Kennedy assassination, believes «there is enough 
mystery in the facts as we know them, enough of conspiracy, coincidence, loose ends, dead ends, 
multiple interpretations. There is no need, he thinks, to invent the grand and masterful scheme, 
the plot that reaches tlawlessly in a dozen directions» (Libra, p. 58). 
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enthusiasm for DeLiJio 's critiques of language, ha ve Jost sight of the human element in 
his novels, most specifically characterization. While his characters are often criticized 
as being flat, his major achievement in The Names, beyond any metafictional musings 
on the role of language, is an investigation in to what it means to be a character, what it 
means to be human, in a world constructed of poststructuralist language. His theme is 
intimacy: intimacy with place, with people, with the world, with the past, and with 
language itself, which becomes, not a barrier against, but a means for, the sharing of 
human experience. What James Axton discovers, as he finally ascends the Acropolis at 
the end of the novel, is the power of memory (ultimately, a linguistic construct) to 
redeem the past through the act of narrative. 
In The Names DeLillo refers to memory as «the faculty of absolution» (304 ). He 
is not, however, the first writer specifically to link memory and the Acropolis together; 
in one of his last writings, «A Disturbance of Mernory on the Acropolis», Freud 
investigates the nature of «derealization,» a defense mechartism by which we categorize 
a piece of reality as strange, something we are anxious to keep out of our egos. In this 
«letter,» Freud relates his incredulity that the Acropolis really exists: «Incredulity of 
this kind is obviously an attempt to repudiare a piece of reality» (242). He finds that 
through derealization he is trying to repudiate a reality he knows will bring joy and 
insight. The Acropolis becomes a rnetaphor for a displaced past doubt or memory of 
doubt. Freud's experience on the Acropolis «culminated in a disturbance of memory 
anda falsification of the past» (246), a derealization, through fear, that protects against, 
but ultirnately prevents, insight. The Names opens similarly, with Axton commenting, 
«For a long time I stayed away frorn the Acropolis. It daunted me, that somber rock» 
(3). Whether or not DeLillo was aware of Freud's experience, it helps us to understand 
why Axton, a man who has been in Athens for overa year, has avoided the Acropolis: 
«The weight and moment of those worked stones promised to make the business of 
seeing them a complicated one. So much converges there. lt's what we've rescued 
from the madness. Beauty, dignity, order, proportion. There are obligations attached to 
such a visit» (3). Axton's derealization and its rescuing of order from madness are 
keeping him away from intimacy, intimacy with beauty, dignity, order, proportion: in 
other words, according to DeLillo, what makes us human. 
The shattered stones of the Acropolis, as it tums out, contain cultural memory. 
According to DeLillo in Mao /l, it is memory as a repository of meaning that terrorism 
seeks to destroy through its attacks on innocent people: 
Maybe that was it. When you inflict punishment on someone who is not 
guilty, when you fill rooms with innocent victims, you begin to empty the world 
ofmeaning and erecta separate mental state, the mind consuming what's outside 
itself, replacing real things with plots and fictions. One fiction taking the world 
narrowly into itself, the other fiction pushing out toward the social order, trying 
to unfold into it. (200) 
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The cinematic metaphor of projecting meaning out onto the blank screen of the 
world is once again evident here. And the use of language for creating sheer plots and 
fictions is the terror of the supposedly nameless cult in The Names. They employ 
names themselves, the repositories of safety, order, and meaning, as the instrument of 
terror, of death, and of chaos. The fiction, the plot, that they try to push out into lhe 
social arder is that there is a special meaning in the correspondence of a particular 
person 's initials with the initials of a particular place, enough to make that person qualify 
as a victim of the cult. A highly arbitrary signifier/signified relationship is presented as 
the establishment of a reality. This relationship, which equates the need for arder with 
terror itself, contradicts the very notion of a controlling order. As DeLillo's Owen 
Brademas, an archeologist who specializes in studying the alphabet, remarks to Axton: 
These killings mock us. They mock our need to structure and classify, to 
build a system against the terror in our souls. They make the system equal to the 
terror. The means to contend with death has become death. (308) 
The making of meaning, the means of putting off or covering up the fundamen-
tal terror of the world, becomes, in the hands of the cult, another way of promoting 
death. Ironically, the cult, through their promotion of terror and death, is seeking a 
means of intimacy: their desire to kill is the very thing that keeps the individual members 
of the cult together as a group. They are people who have a common purpose. This is 
a perversion of the intimacy that Ax ton himself has been unable to face in his own life 
and his involvement with the places and people around him. 
As a systern of stability, as a barrier against having to <leal with terror on a perso-
nal as well as a política! level, Axton clings to the cliched notion of the American as 
tourist in a multinational world. «I go everywhere twice. Once to get the wrong 
impression, once to strengthen it» (255). For knowledge implies intimacy, and once 
intirnacy is achieved, the category of tourist disappears. Axton is well aware of this 
power of knowledge to bring intimacy: 
1 began to think of myself as a perennial tourist. There was sornething 
agreeable about this. To be a tourist is to escape accountability. You're able to 
drift across continents and languages, suspending the operation of sound thought. 
Tourism is the march of stupidity. You're expected to be stupid ... being stupid is 
the pattem, the leve! and the norm ... I was happy not knowing. 1 wanted to 
preserve the surprise in an opaque medium. This happened rnany times in large 
and small ways. Athens was my legal home but I wasn 't ready to give up tourism, 
even here. (43-44) 
Paradoxically, pattems such as «being stupid,» repetitions that contain the iUusion 
of control, also contain what DeLillo calls the «Surprise» of routine. For part of being 
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a tourist, of not knowing a place, is to be continually surprised by it: «My life was full 
of routine surprises. One day 1 was watching runners from Marathon dodge taxis near 
the Athens Hilton, the next 1 was tuming a comer in Istanbul to see a gypsy leading a 
bear on a leash» (43). Without connection, without intimacy, and caught in a routine 
that only looks forward to the next surprise that itselfviolates (then becomes a part of) 
the routine, Axton's life is the life ofthe perennial tourist, «With nothing to think about 
but the next shapeless event» (44). 
The real surprise is that, in this disconnected world of pattem and repetition, 
terror itself has become commonplace: «There had been over five thousand terrorist 
incidents in the last decade. Kidnappings were routine business. Ransom requests for 
five million dollars were not unusual. In this decade a quarter of a billion dollars in 
ransom money had been paid to terrorists» (46). Making his living from this situation, 
Axton works as a risk analyst; his boss, George Rowser, uses the information Axton 
gathers through his travels to convince insurance companies to provide ransom insurance 
for executives who could be targets of kidnappings and extortion attempts. Ironically, 
having ransom insurance makes an executive an even more likely target for terrorists, 
since they know the company will pay. For Axton, who has always worked freelance, 
working for Rowser offers the safety of routine in a way that also seems to «manage» 
terror: «I'd have a steady job, an office, a secretary, a schedule and clear-cut 
responsibilities» (49). Terror has become merely another cost to be factored in for 
Americans doing business overseas and ironically, the shaky foundation for Ax ton 's 
supposedly stable employment. In the world of international corporations and cartels, 
terror has been subdued and codified. 
Pattems, routines, connections are the grids that human beings impose on chaos 
to provide the illusion of arder and safety. Beneath the pattem, however, is the darkness 
of a non-codifiable terror. According to Owen Brademas, at night, «the things of the 
world are no longer discrete. All the day's layers and distinctions fade in the dark. 
Night is continuous» (81 ). What violates the authority of pattem is that something always 
comes along that disrupts the pattem, that is not part of the pattem. No matter how 
complete a paltem may seem to be, there is always a surprise growing out ofthe routine 
system, a violation of routine that points out the incompleteness of the pattem. So a 
new pattem is constructed that assimilates the surprise into a new routine. But ultimately, 
only night, terror, chaos are continuous, always there to unravel the carefully constructed 
structures of daylight and safety. 
The cult's «random» killings point to a revelation of the power of chaos and 
terror in The Names, of course, but in Axton's world even terror itself can become 
routine, codifiable, part of the pattem. It is Owen, Lhe master oflanguages, who suggests 
that there is sense, meaning, pattem behind the killings, and Axton, unable or unwilling 
to become intimate with the places and people in his own life, still is caught in a quest 
to discover what that meaning is. Somehow, it is intimately connected with the cult 's 
interest in the alphabet. 
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According to DeLillo, Janguage is the medium we use to make the connections, 
to construct the patterns that give meaning to our Iives. Yet language functions as a thin 
veneer to cover the fact that «night is continuous.» lt even functions as what he 
metaphorically calls «one-sentence stories»: 
AH these places were one-sentence stories to us. Someone would turn up, 
utter a sentence about foot-long lizards in his hotel room in Niamey, and this 
became the solid matter of the place, the means we used to fix it in our minds. 
The sentence was effective, overshadowing deeper fears, hesitancies, a rife 
disquiet. (94) 
But these one-sentence stories are not representative of the place, nor do they 
succeed in containing the terror ofthe unknown. Axton, for example, always Iies to his 
concierge about where he is going: 
But the Iies began to worry me ... there was something metaphysically 
disturbing about them. A grave misplacement. They were not simple but complex. 
What was I tampering with, the human faith in naming, the lifelong system of 
images in Niko's brain? I was leaving behind in the person of the concierge an 
enormous discrepancy between my uttered joumey and the actual movements 1 
made in the externa! world, a four-thousand-mile fict ion, a deep lie. (103) 
By tampering with «the human faith in naming,» Axton 's lies and the cult's 
murders reveal the arbitrary relationship between the world and the words with which 
we attempt to represen! it. Our patterns, our routines, are incapable of ordering chaos 
and terror because the very medium they are constructed of is unstable and arbitrary. 
For DeLillo, language, pattem, routine are, at best, fragmentary and incomplete structures 
of stability. 
But they are also ali we have to use in order to construct meaning in our lives. 
The meaning ofthe present, according to DeLillo, is built upon how we verbally arrange 
thc fragments of the past. Through pattem, through connection, the past can communicate 
to the present; only in that sense «one age speaks to another» (80). Interpretation, 
repctition of meaning, plays a key role in DeLillo's notion of intimacy, intimacy with 
both the present and the past. Axton comes to believe in the power of memory to 
connect the past and the present, to give meaning to life. Looking back on what he's 
been through and the people he's known, he says: 
These are among the people I've tried to know twice, the second time in 
memory and language. Through them, myself. They are what I've become, in 
ways I don 't understand but which I believe will accrue to a rounded truth, a 
second life forme as well as for them. (329) 
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This second life, orrounded truth, is the truth offiction, formed through narrativ• 
reworking and connection. The pattem of memory and narrative becomes the truth, no 
what the pattem may signify outside itself. It is the act of fiction that DeLillo mos 
strongly supports here, the narrative of a life reconstructed and reworked through memor: 
and provisional, fictive pattems. 
No longer seeking to avoid insight through the process of derealization, Axtrn 
finally ascends the Acropolis with a mass of other tourists. It is this connection with thi 
mass ofhumanity, this intimacy with people and place, that defines what it means to b 
human: 
I walk to the east face of the temple, so much space and openness, los 
walls, pediments, roof, a grief for what has escaped containment. And this i 
what 1 mainly leamed up there, that the Parthenon was not a thing to study but t• 
feel. It wasn't aloof, rational, timeless, pure. I couldn't locate the serenity offü 
place, the logic and steady sense. It wasn't a relic species of dead Greece bu 
part of the living city below it. This was a surprise. 1 'd thought it was a separat· 
thing, the sacred height, intact in its Doric order. I hadn't expected a humai 
feeling to emerge from the stones but this is what I found, deeper than the art an1 
mathematics embodied in the structure, the optical exactitudes. 1 found a cry fo 
pity. This is what remains to the mauled stones in their blue surround, this ope· 
cry, this voice we know as our own. (330) 
In the routine ofbeing a tourist, Axton now finds a surprise, the connected intimac 
of the dead past of the Acropolis with the living present of Athens. The art, th 
mathematics, the structure itself become meaningless by themselves, but lhe memor 
ofthe past, connected with the present, providesAxton with intimacy, with pity for th 
rest of bis fellow tourists, all seeking to fill the emptiness and fear of the self and th 
world. On this ancient foundation of Western civilization, Axton finds that he is n 
longer alone. «This is a place to enter in crowds, seek company and talk. Everyone i 
talking. 1 move past the scaffolding and walk down the steps, hearing one languag 
after another, rich, harsh, mysterious, strong. This is what we bring to the temple, ne 
prayer or chant or slaughtered rams. Our offering is language» (p. 331). It is in thi 
Babel of languages that Axton discovers how we seek to fill the void, through intimac 
with language, «the fallen wonder of the world» (339). 
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